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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 10-2278 
_______________ 
 
A.B., by and through her parents, 
Susan and Mark B., 
 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY INTERMEDIATE UNIT 
      
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-07-cv-02798) 
District Judge:  Honorable Louis H. Pollak 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 11, 2011 
_______________ 
 
Before:  RENDELL, AMBRO, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 27, 2011) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
Plaintiff-appellant A.B. appeals the District Court‟s decision granting summary 
judgment to defendant-appellee Montgomery County Intermediate Unit (“MCIU”) on 
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A.B.‟s claim under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et 
seq (“IDEA”).1  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
Under the IDEA, the District Court was “obliged to conduct a modified de novo 
review, giving „due weight‟ to the underlying administrative proceedings.”  C.H. v. Cape 
Henlopen Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 65 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  We review the District Court‟s legal conclusions de novo.  Id.   
The IDEA requires states to provide a “free appropriate public education” 
(“FAPE”) to each disabled child between the ages of three and twenty-one.  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412(a)(1)(A).  States meet that requirement by creating for each disabled student an 
“individualized education plan” (“IEP”), which sets out a “package of special educational 
and related services designed to meet the unique needs of the disabled child.”  Ferren C. 
v. Sch. Dist. Of Phila., 612 F.3d 712, 717 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  To satisfy the IDEA, an IEP must be “„reasonably calculated‟ to enable 
the child to receive „meaningful educational benefits‟ in light of the student‟s „intellectual 
potential.‟”  Shore Regional High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 
2004) (citation omitted).  Parents who believe that the implementation of a proposed IEP 
will not result in a FAPE for their child are entitled to an “impartial due process hearing,” 
presided over by a hearing officer.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(f).   
                                              
1
 A.B. also filed suit under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, but does not appeal the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment as to those 
claims. 
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A.B. is a hearing-impaired child with a cochlear implant, and MCIU created for 
her an IEP directing that she begin preschool at a planned (but not yet operational) public 
school classroom designed for children with hearing impairments.  A.B.‟s parents, who 
wanted A.B. to attend the Clarke Pennsylvania School instead of the designated public 
school, unsuccessfully challenged this decision in a due process hearing, and then 
appealed to the District Court.  It rejected the appeal in a carefully reasoned 32-page 
opinion.   
In our Court, A.B. primarily argues that the District Court should have rejected the 
hearing officer‟s conclusions based on his purported bias, or at least should have 
permitted discovery about the potential bias.  A.B.‟s bias allegation is based on the fact 
that the hearing officer was a former co-worker with MCIU counsel and a current co-
worker with MCIU counsel‟s wife.  A.B. further theorizes that the resulting bias led the 
hearing officer to reject the testimony of her expert witness, Jean Moog, and that this 
exclusion tilted the balance of the evidence away from A.B. and toward MCIU.  
Additionally, A.B. generally challenges the sufficiency of the IEP, and argues that it was 
improper for MCIU to propose that A.B. be placed in a classroom that was not 
operational at the time the IEP was drafted.   
The District Court rejected A.B.‟s argument that due process required the hearing 
officer, at minimum, to disclose his working relationship with MCIU counsel or 
counsel‟s wife.  Nonetheless, the Court agreed with A.B. that the hearing officer erred by 
discounting Moog‟s testimony.  However, the District Court then reviewed the entirety of 
the evidence, including Moog‟s testimony, and concluded that A.B. and her parents had 
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not satisfied the relevant legal standard because their evidence went primarily to whether 
the IEP would provide an ideal education, and not whether it was “reasonably calculated” 
to provide “meaningful educational benefits.”  Accordingly, the District Court concluded 
that the hearing officer‟s determination should not be disturbed.   
After reviewing the parties‟ briefs and relevant portions of the record, we conclude 
that the District Court correctly applied the relevant legal standards, and affirm for 
substantially the reasons stated by that Court.    
 
